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Non-Technical Summary
Central bank communication is increasingly important to both central banks and fi-
nancial market participants. Effective communication should ensure that financial
markets understand the central bank’s interest rate policy. However, central bank
communication is not always effective and interest rate forecast errors can occur for
two reasons. First, forecasters may understand monetary policy but misperceive fu-
ture interest rate decisions simply because they are wrong about future inflation and
output. Second, the forecasters may fail to understand monetary policy and the in-
terest rate rule applied by the central bank.
This paper aims to shed more light on communication by the European Central Bank
(ECB), disagreement among financial experts over future interest rate decisions, and
the sources of policy misperception. To this end, we use survey data on expected
interest rates, inflation and output growth from the Financial Market Survey collected
by the Centre for European Economic Research. We assume that the ECB sets the
interest rates according to a Taylor rule and that the surveyed financial market experts
base their interest rate forecasts on a Taylor rule likewise. In the following, we form
interest rate forecast errors and decompose them according to a Taylor–rule–type
model. Consequently, we can infer whether the financial market experts correctly
perceive the ECB reaction function.
The empirical findings show that the financial market experts systematically misper-
ceive the ECB’s Taylor rule parameters. More precisely, their estimate of the inflation
parameter is higher than the ECB’s inflation parameter but becomes more accurate
after an ECB clarification about its monetary policy strategy in May 2003. The esti-
mation results further suggest that the disagreement among experts about the ECB’s
reaction to inflation has not increased since the financial market crisis.
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Zusammenfassung
Kommunikation von Zentralbanken gewinnt fu¨r Zentralbanken selbst wie auch fu¨r
Akteure an Finanzma¨rkten an Bedeutung. Eine effektive Kommunikation soll sicher
stellen, dass die Finanzma¨rkte die Zinspolitik der Zentralbanken verstehen. Dennoch
sind Zinsprognosen nicht immer korrekt; Prognosefehler haben im Wesentlichen zwei
Ursachen. Erstens kann es sein, dass Finanzmarktteilnehmer zwar die geldpolitische
Strategie verstehen, jedoch ku¨nftige Zinsentscheidungen falsch voraussagen, da sie
falsche Annahmen u¨ber Inflation und Wachstum treffen. Zweitens kann es sein, dass
Finanzmarktexperten die von der Zentralbank angewendete Zinsregel nicht kennen.
Diese Arbeit untersucht die Kommunikationspolitik der Europa¨ischen Zentralbank
(EZB), die Uneinigkeit unter Finanzmarktexperten hinsichtlich ku¨nftiger Zinsentschei-
dungen und die Ursachen unzutreffender Zinsprognosen. Hierzu verwenden wir Um-
fragedaten zu erwarteten Zinsen, Inflation und Konjunktur, die im Rahmen des Fi-
nanzmarkttests vom Zentrum fu¨r Europa¨ische Wirtschaftsforschung erhoben werden.
Wir nehmen an, dass die EZB die Zinsen entsprechend einer Taylorregel setzt und dass
die befragten Experten ihre Zinsprognosen ebenfalls auf Grundlage einer Taylorregel
bilden. Im Weiteren bilden wir Zinsprognosefehler und schlu¨sseln sie entsprechend
der Taylorregel von Zentralbank und Experte auf. Daraus schlussfolgern wir, ob die
Umfrageteilnehmer die Taylorregel der EZB korrekt wahrnehmen.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Finanzmarktexperten die Taylorregel der EZB nicht
korrekt einscha¨tzen. Sie geben dem Inflationsparameter ein gro¨ßeres Gewicht als die
EZB. Seit einer Kommunikation der EZB im Ma¨rz 2003, die die geldpolitische Strate-
gie klarer dargelegt hat, ko¨nnen die Finanzmarktexperten die Reaktion der EZB auf
Inflation besser einscha¨tzen. Die Scha¨tzergebnisse legen außerdem nahe, dass die Un-
einigkeit der befragten Experten u¨ber die Reaktion der EZB auf Inflationsrisiken seit
dem Ausbruch der Finanzkrise nicht zugenommen hat.
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Abstract
This paper investigates why financial market experts misperceive the interest
rate policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). Assuming a Taylor–rule–type
reaction function of the ECB, we use qualitative survey data on expectations
about the future interest rate, inflation, and output to discover the sources of in-
dividual interest rate forecast errors. Based on a panel random coefficient model,
we show that financial experts have systematically misperceived the ECB’s in-
terest rate rule. However, although experts tend to overestimate the impact of
inflation on future interest rates, perceptions of monetary policy have become
more accurate since clarification of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy in May
2003. We find that this improved communication has reduced disagreement over
the ECB’s response to expected inflation during the financial crisis.
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1 Introduction
Central bank communication is increasingly important to both central banks and fi-
nancial market participants, see Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, DeHaan, and Jansen
(2008). Effective communication should ensure that financial markets understand the
central bank’s interest rate policy, i.e., how interest rate decisions are linked to future
inflation and output. However, central bank communication is not always effective
and interest rate forecast errors can, and do, occur for two reasons. First, forecasters
may indeed understand monetary policy but misperceive future interest rate decisions
simply because they are wrong about future inflation and output. Second, the fore-
casters actually do not understand monetary policy and the interest rate rule applied
by the central bank. In this case, communication should be improved because mar-
kets will misperceive interest rate decisions even under perfect information about the
economic outlook. This paper employs survey data on financial market expectations
about future interest rates, inflation, and output in the Euro area to shed more light on
communication by the European Central Bank (ECB), disagreement among financial
experts over future interest rate decisions, and the sources of policy misperception.
Our analysis employs individual interest rate forecasts by financial market experts
taken from the Financial Market Survey conducted by the Centre for European Eco-
nomic Research (ZEW). This is a monthly survey and comprises a rich set of quali-
tative expectations as to short–term interest rates, inflation, and output. Assuming
that experts use Taylor–rule–type forecast equations for short–term interest rates, we
explore whether interest rate forecast errors are driven by uncertainty about the fu-
ture course of inflation and output or whether experts are confused about monetary
policy rules. In particular, we assess the consequences of a major change in ECB
communication that occurred in May 2003, at which time the ECB provided a more
precise definition of price stability (inflation should be below but close to 2%) and
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deemphasized the role of monetary aggregates for short–term policy decisions. Since
then, the ECB’s monetary analysis puts more emphasis on the long–term relation-
ship between money supply and inflation. We also investigate whether the market’s
understanding of monetary policy has been affected by the recent economic crisis.
A great deal of research confirms the predictive content of survey data for macroe-
conomic variables, see e.g. Mitchell and Pearce (2007) and Dreger and Stadtmann
(2008), who study the forecasting performance of the Wall Street Journal’s panel of
economists. Nolte and Pohlmeier (2007) find that economic indicators derived from
the ZEW survey give good quality forecasts. Thus, survey data on expectations are
increasingly used in the literature to evaluate central bank communication. For ex-
ample, Capistra´n and Ramos-Francia (2010) and Ehrmann, Eijffinger, and Fratzscher
(2010) explore how the introduction of inflation targeting affects the dispersion of in-
flation expectations in surveys. Lange, Sack, and Whitesell (2003), Swanson (2006),
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007), and Sturm and de Haan (2009) show that more
transparent communication generally improves market participants’ predictions of the
central bank’s interest rate decisions.
All these contributions focus on the size and other statistical properties of individual
forecast errors; no attempt is made to explain why interest rate forecast errors are
made. Work by Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2009) is closest in spirit to the
approach we undertake here. These authors investigate the role of geography, i.e., the
forecaster’s location, in interest rate forecast error. By estimating Taylor–rule–type
relationships for each forecaster separately, they decompose forecast errors as being ei-
ther systematic or unsystematic. We extend Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2009)
in that our analysis of financial market experts’ interest rate forecast errors includes
information from the individual forecasts about inflation and output. Moreover, be-
cause we estimate a panel random coefficient model that allows for a dispersion of
the estimated coefficients, our empirical approach can estimate the disagreement be-
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tween financial experts over monetary policy strategy, see Swamy (1970) and Rangvid,
Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2009).
Our empirical results confirm that both the ECB and financial market experts use
inflation as a Taylor rule argument. However, financial experts tend to overestimate
the ECB’s interest rate reaction to inflation. The ECB’s attempt to clarify its mon-
etary policy strategy in 2003 actually improved communication regarding the role of
inflation. However, disagreement among experts about the central bank’s reaction to
output growth has increased since the beginning of the financial crisis, suggesting that
financial market experts have difficulty assessing the ECB’s strategy with respect to
output fluctuations.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the ZEW financial market
survey data and briefly discusses how recent work has used the aggregate survey
balance statistics versus the individual survey expectations. Section 3 derives and
decomposes interest rate forecast errors from a standard Taylor rule. Section 4 presents
the econometric model, Section 5 sets out the empirical results on misperception of
the ECB interest rate policy; Section 6 concludes.
2 Survey Data on Expectations
2.1 The ZEW Financial Market Survey
2.1.1 The Data Set
Since December 1991, the ZEW has been asking approximately 350 financial sector
professionals about their expectations regarding a large set of macroeconomic vari-
ables, such as inflation, output, and interest rates. These professionals, or ”financial
market experts,” usually have an academic background in economics and are also
engaged in observing economic developments so they should be highly qualified for
forecasting economic developments. Most of them work at banks (60%); the rest are
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employed by the insurance industry (10%), financial departments of industrial compa-
nies (11%), or by other financial service providers. A majority (88%) of these financial
market experts are employed in Germany, 10% are located within the European region,
and 2% are from non-European countries.
Usually during the first two weeks of a month, the financial market experts are asked
whether they expect short–term interest rates to decrease (-1), stay constant (0), or
to increase (1) within the next six months. The experts are asked for their predictions
of the three–month interbank rate, i.e., the three–month Euribor in the Euro zone.
Other questions asked that are relevant to this study have to do with changes in the
annual inflation rate and the economic situation in the Euro zone. We approximate
them by the six–month change in HICP inflation and by the six–month growth rate
of industrial production, respectively. We prefer industrial production to GDP data
because the former are available monthly, whereas the latter are available only quar-
terly. Table 4 in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics, Table 5 the detailed
survey questions, and Figure 1 in the Appendix is a graphical illustration of the HICP
inflation rate and the six–month growth rate of industrial production. The ZEW
publishes aggregate balance statistics, defined as the difference between the relative
share of answers falling into the categories ”increase” and ”decrease.” In contrast, our
analysis uses the individual, qualitative assessments of the experts. Of the 350 experts
questioned each month, on average, about 300 answer. Thus, we base the estimation
on an unbalanced panel of around 300 observations each month. For a sample period
from January 2000 to March 2009, this gives us 32,072 observations.
2.1.2 The Forecasting Performance of Aggregate Balance Statistics
The forecasting performance of the ZEW survey expectations is detailed in the lit-
erature. Breitung and Jagodzinski (2001) and Hu¨fner and Schro¨der (2002) find that
the ZEW Economic Sentiment Indicator, the survey’s aggregate balance statistic of
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output growth expectations for Germany, has good forecasting quality. The forecast-
ing power of inflation and short–term interest rate balances is tested by Nolte and
Pohlmeier (2007). The authors discuss a VAR–based forecasting approach and quan-
tification methods that transform the shares of positive and negative assessments from
the survey into a quantitative variable, see Carlson and Parkin (1975), and on the re-
gression approach Pesaran (1984). Nolte and Pohlmeier (2007) find that the survey
forecasts are unbiased and that their predictive power is comparable to a random
walk. Furthermore, they find no support for the hypothesis that experts’ forecasting
quality depends on subgroups. Ullrich (2008) quantifies the aggregate shares of infla-
tion expectations by means of the Carlson–Parkin method and shows that they are
significantly influenced by ECB rhetoric. Her findings suggest that financial market
experts keep a sharp eye on ECB communication. These papers have in common
that they work with the aggregate balance statistics and do not consider individual
heterogeneity.
2.1.3 Heterogeneous Forecasters
When exploring the expectation formation process, one should account for the het-
erogeneity of forecasters, which can be done in several ways. For the Wall Street
Journal’s panel of economists, Mitchell and Pearce (2007) classify the participants ac-
cording to subgroups depending on industry or experience. For the same survey panel,
Dreger and Stadtmann (2008) show that the heterogeneity in exchange rate forecasts
cannot be explained by individual forecasts of macroeconomic variables in the survey
context. A more sophisticated way to model forecasters’ heterogeneity is proposed by
Rangvid, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2009). They estimate a panel random coefficient
model for the stock market expectations of participants in the ZEW financial market
survey. In the following, we adopt the random coefficient approach where forecasters’
heterogeneity is reflected in the distribution of estimated coefficients.
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2.2 Individual Interest Rate Forecasts and Taylor Rules
Most of the relevant literature evaluating the accuracy of forecasts makes no attempt
to explain the sources of interest rate forecast errors. In an exception to this trend,
Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2009) employ a Taylor rule model to investigate
interest rate forecast errors of professional ECB policy forecasters. They use quantita-
tive survey data from a Reuters poll in which financial institutions were asked for the
expected policy rate. Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2009) decompose the interest
rate forecast errors (rejt − rt) of forecaster j into a systematic (sj) and an unsystem-
atic (uj) component. The systematic part depends on the individual Taylor–rule–type
forecast equation
rejt − rt = βˆjrrt−1 +
∑
βˆjkxkt + βˆjpip˜ijt − rt + uˆjt = sˆjt + uˆjt.
where xkt are macroeconomic variables and p˜ijt is the inflation differential of the coun-
try in which the forecaster is located, relative to the Euro zone average. Their em-
pirical results indicate that the systematic component matters for forecast accuracy.
In particular, descriptive statistics on average errors suggest that forecasters from
financial centers such as Frankfurt or London provide more accurate forecasts.1
This paper extends Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2009) in two important re-
spects. First, since the ZEW financial market survey not only asks for expected
interest rates, but also for expected inflation and output, we can include forward–
looking Taylor rule arguments in each individual interest rate forecast equation, see
Section 3. Second, our econometric framework uses a random coefficient model to ex-
plicitly model the forecasters’ disagreement over appropriate Taylor rule parameters,
see Section 4.
1In a related work, Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2006) show that for the case of anticipating
Fed monetary policy decisions, regional differences within the United States play a significant role.
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3 Forecasting Interest Rates with Taylor Rules
3.1 The Interest Rate Policy of the Central Bank
Ever since Taylor’s (1993) seminal work, reaction functions specified as Taylor rules,
where the central bank determines the key policy rate in response to inflation and
output, have been the predominant way of modeling interest rate setting by central
banks. Starting with Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1998), much empirical work con-
firms that Taylor rules are remarkably adept at describing central bank interest rate
decisions (for recent examples, see Jansen and de Haan (2009); Grammig and Kehrle
(2008)). In accordance with Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2009), we assume that
the central bank sets the short–term interest rate in response to contemporaneous
output and inflation:
∆6it = α∆6pit + β∆6yt. (1)
The Taylor rule is defined in terms of sixth differences (∆6) because the qualitative
survey data refer to interest rate changes over six months. From a theoretical point of
view, the output gap should be part of the Taylor rule. However, by taking differences,
potential output drops out of the equation.
3.2 Decomposing Individual Forecast Errors
If the central bank follows a Taylor rule, financial market experts may also use a Taylor
rule in formulating their expectations of the central bank decision. Given the survey
horizon of six months, an expert j is expected to form his interest rate expectations
in t− 6 for period t according to the following Taylor–rule–type forecast equation
∆6iejt = αj∆6pi
e
jt + βj∆6y
e
jt. (2)
According to Equation (2), the interest rate change expected by expert j depends
on his expected change in inflation ∆6piejt and output ∆6y
e
jt. Note that the expert’s
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expectations for inflation and output should be interpreted as a proxy for the fore-
casts the expert assumes the central bank to have. Unfortunately, these expectations
are not asked about in the survey. However, it is likely that experts’ inflation and
output expectations are influenced by the central bank forecasts, which are regularly
published.
The interest rate forecast errors ei∗jt are obtained by subtracting the financial market
expert’s forecast (Equation (2)) from the actually observed interest rate set by the
central bank (Equation (1))
ei∗jt = ∆6it −∆6iejt
= α∆6pit + β∆6yt −
(
αj∆6piejt + βj∆6y
e
jt
)
, (3)
where the asterisk in ei∗jt is used to be consistent with the latent variable formulation
of the econometric model in Section 4. Equation (3) will be estimated in Section 5. To
derive the financial market experts’ misperception regarding central bank parameters,
Equation (3) is rewritten as:
ei∗jt = αje
pi
jt + βje
y
jt + (α− αj)∆6pit + (β − βj)∆6yt, (4)
with epijt = ∆6pit−∆6piejt and eyjt = ∆6yt−∆6yejt. Equation (4) shows that the overall
individual interest rate forecast error can be decomposed into two parts. The first part
(αjepijt + βje
y
jt) follows from the error a financial market expert makes in forecasting
inflation and output. The second component ((α− αj)∆6pit + (β − βj)∆6yt) is due to
the analyst’s misperception of how the central bank will react to changes in inflation
and output. The central bank can influence both causes of error. First, it can provide
the public with macroeconomic projections and, second, it can explain how it reacts
to changes in these variables.
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3.3 Qualitative Interest Rate Forecast Errors
The answers of the surveyed experts are qualitative, whereas the actual, observed
data series is continuous. One way of making the two comparable is to transform the
aggregate shares of responses into a quantitative series.2 In our application, where
the focus is on the individual level, it is more appropriate to transform the realized,
quantitative interest rate data into a qualitative variable. To that aim, we transform
the sixth differences of the actual interest rate series (∆6it) into the corresponding
qualitative variable ∆6i
q
jt as follows:
∆6i
q
jt =

1 if ∆6ij < ∆6it
0 if ∆6ij ≤ ∆6it ≤ ∆6ij
−1 if ∆6it < ∆6ij ,
(5)
where ∆6ij and ∆6ij denote individual lower and upper thresholds, which have been
surveyed by a special question in the ZEW survey. Within these—partly asymmetrical—
thresholds, a financial market analyst would continue to say that the underlying
macroeconomic variable will not change. Note that individual thresholds imply that
the qualitative interest rate variable ∆6i
q
jt also depends on the expert.
3 The qualita-
tive interest rate forecast errors eijt of expert j are defined as the difference between
the qualitative change of the interest rate ∆6i
q
jt and the expert’s forecast made in
period t− 6 for the change of i six months ahead ∆6iejt:
eijt = ∆6i
q
jt −∆6iejt; eijt ∈ {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2} (6)
The descriptive statistics on the resulting qualitative interest rate forecast errors,
provided in Table 1, show that the mean value of the forecast error ei is close to
zero. Moreover, the forecast errors are always between -1 and +1, implying that the
directional forecast has always been correct.
2Nardo (2003) critically reviews the prevailing quantification methods. She concludes that they
do not prove superior to the original, qualitative data.
3We use the individual threshold values when they are available and the average thresholds if the
individual threshold is not available.
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Table 1: Qualitative interest rate forecast errors of experts: Descriptive statistics
Jan 00 - Oct 03 Nov 03 - Jul 07 Aug 07 - Mar 09
Interest rate forecast errors
µ(ei) -0.01 -0.38 -0.23
σ(ei) 0.83 0.60 0.77
Min(ei) -1 -1 -1
Max(ei) 1 1 1
# obs 14,183 12,758 5,132
Notes: Qualitative interest rate forecast errors of the surveyed interest
rate expectations versus the 3–month Euribor as constructed in Equa-
tion (6).
4 The Econometric Model
4.1 Panel Random Coefficient Ordered Logit Model
Table 1 shows that the interest rate forecast errors of experts as derived from the
ZEW survey are qualitative variables with three ordered outcomes. To explore the
determinants of the errors, estimating an ordered logit model is a natural choice. We
thus estimate the following econometric model for the latent variable ei∗jt for expert j,
j = 1, ..., N , in month t, t = 0, ..., Tj :
ei∗jt = α∆6pit + β∆6yt −
(
αj∆6piejt + βj∆6y
e
jt
)
+ εjt. (7)
The logit model assumes that εjt are i.i.d. and follow a logistic distribution Φ. The
outcome probabilities P for the observed values ei of the latent variable conditional
on the vector of explanatory variables zjt = (1,∆6pit,∆6yt,∆6piejt,∆6y
e
jt) are defined
as follows, see Wooldridge (2001):
P (eijt = −1|zjt) = P (ei∗jt ≤ 0|zjt) = Φ(−z′jtδj)
P (eijt = 0|zjt) = P (0 < ei∗jt ≤ ς1|zjt) = Φ(ς1 − z′jtδj)− Φ(−z′jtδj) (8)
P (eijt = 1|zjt) = P (ς1 < ei∗jt) = 1− Φ(ς1 − z′jtδj)
where ς1 is a threshold parameter for the probability categories.
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To measure dispersion of the forecasting models across the financial market experts,
we estimate a random coefficient model according to Swamy (1970). Under this ap-
proach, we incorporate cross–sectional heterogeneity of the assessments for inflation
and output. Cross–sectional heterogeneity in Equation (7) is introduced via the ran-
dom coefficients αj and βj . Specifically, the random coefficients are specified as follows:(
αj
βj
)
=
(
α¯
β¯
)
+
(
σα 0
0 σβ
)(
ξαj
ξβj
)
(9)
with ξαj , ξ
β
j ∼ N (0, 1). σα and σβ measure the dispersion of the estimated model
coefficients across the financial market experts. Systematic misperception of monetary
policy is present if the mean values α¯ and β¯ deviate significantly from α and β, the
central bank parameters.
4.2 The ECB’s Clarification of the Monetary Policy Strategy
Given the economic interpretation of the mean and dispersion parameters of the ran-
dom coefficient model for the experts’ interest rate forecast errors, we now test whether
these parameters responded to ECB communication or to the financial market crisis.
The ECB made two announcements with respect to monetary policy strategy. In the
first, in October 1998,4 the ECB declared that its strategy would consist of three el-
ements. Price stability, the primary objective, would be achieved with inflation rates
of below 2%. Money would play a prominent role in assessing the risks to price sta-
bility and the outlook for price stability would be based on a broad assessment. In
May 2003,5 the ECB released the second statement on monetary policy strategy. This
communication mainly confirms ECB’s definition of price stability, but specifies more
clearly that inflation rates of less than, but close to, 2% are desirable. At the same
time, by classifying money as a means for cross–checking the risks to price stability,
the role of money in its short–term interest rate policy was de–emphasized.
4See ECB press release ”A stability–oriented monetary policy strategy for the ESCB” on October
13, 1998.
5See ECB press release ”The ECB’s monetary policy” on May 8, 2003.
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The ECB has repeatedly emphasized that the May 2003 announcement should be
viewed as a clarification and should not be misinterpreted as a change in its monetary
policy strategy, see, e.g., Berger, de Haan, and Sturm (2006). Accordingly, the ex-
perts’ understanding of monetary policy should have become clearer due to improved
central bank communication. In terms of the econometric model, the mean coeffi-
cients should be closer to the central bank coefficients after the May announcement
and the dispersion parameters should have decreased. Because the ECB explicitly
”confirmed” its strategy and has since emphasized that the announcement was not a
change in policy, in our estimation we assume that the central bank parameters are
constant over time. Similarly, we assume that ECB’s monetary policy strategy did
not change during the financial market crisis. In fact, the ECB has not published
any statements to the contrary. Also, during the financial market crisis, the ECB
motivated interest rate decreases with diminished inflation risks.
5 Why Financial Experts Misperceive the ECB’s Interest
Rate Decisions: Empirical Results
Table 2 presents the results from a panel random coefficient ordered logit estimation.
The upper part of the table presents the nonrandom coefficients. We interacted the
experts’ Taylor rule parameters with three dummy variables, DI , DII , DIII , respec-
tively. Thus, we can infer how the ECB communication in 2003 or the financial crisis
influenced the experts’ Taylor rule parameters. The lower part of Table 2 sets forth
the random coefficients of the financial market experts, which are shown in terms of
the parameter means across experts (α¯, β¯) and the dispersion measures (σα, σβ).
The positive central bank parameter α for inflation indicates that the probability
of tighter monetary policy increases with inflation. This result is in line with the
ECB’s monetary policy strategy, which clearly emphasizes price stability as its primary
objective. In contrast, the sign of the estimated output parameter β of the central bank
12
Table 2: Estimated Taylor rule coefficients and dispersion measures
Dependent variable: Interest rate forecast errors eijt
Central bank parameter α 0.11
β -0.47
Financial market experts
Jan 2000 - Oct 2003 Nov 2003 - Jul 2007 Aug 2007 - Mar 2009
α¯I 0.52 α¯II 0.39 α¯III 0.25
σIα 0.34 σ
II
α 0.29 σ
III
α 0.29
β¯I -0.72 β¯II -0.76 β¯III 0.26
σIβ 0.31 σ
II
β 0.22 σ
III
β 0.65
MSEα 0.28 0.16 0.10
MSEβ 0.16 0.13 0.96
Pseudo R2 0.26 N 473 # obs 32,072
Notes: ei∗jt = α∆6pit−(αIj∆6piejtDI+αIIj ∆6piejtDII+αIIIj ∆6piejtDIII)+β∆6yt−(βIj∆6yejtDI+
βIIj ∆6y
e
jtD
II+βIIIj ∆6y
e
jtD
III). γj = γ¯+Λvj . MSEγ = (γ¯−γ)2+σ2γ . All estimated Taylor
rule coefficients presented are significant at the 1-percent level. Estimation by simulated
maximum likelihood with 250 Halton draws.
is puzzling because it suggests that positive economic growth makes tighter monetary
policy less likely. For the financial market experts, we interact the explanatory variable
with dummy variables such that we obtain three parameter values. Specifically, to
test whether the May 2003 clarification led to greater understanding of the ECB’s
policy, we introduce a dummy variable DII for the period from November 2003, the
first month when expectations from May 2003 were realized, until July 2007. The
dummy variable DI captures the first part from January 2000 to October 2003. In
August 2007, the financial market crisis started and is accounted for by DIII .
According to Table 2, the experts have a significantly positive inflation parameter in
all three subperiods. Table 3 shows the average analyst misperception of central bank
reaction with respect to inflation (α¯−α) and output growth (β¯−β). According to the
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Table 3: Wald tests on Taylor rule parameter equality
H0 : D = 0 D p-value
Misperception of ECB policy (Expert - ECB coefficient)
Inflation α¯I − α = 0.41 0.00
α¯II − α = 0.28 0.00
α¯III − α = 0.14 0.00
Output β¯I − β = -0.25 0.00
β¯II − β = -0.29 0.00
β¯III − β = 0.73 0.00
Impact of ECB communication in 2003
α¯II − α¯I = -0.13 0.00
β¯II − β¯I = -0.04 0.21
Change in expert’s coefficient due to crisis
α¯III − α¯II = -0.14 0.00
β¯III − β¯II = 1.02 0.02
Notes: Wald statistics refer to the estimated coefficients in Table 2.
corresponding Wald test statistics, the experts significantly overestimated the central
bank’s inflation parameter. The ECB’s clarification in 2003 induced a significant
change in the analysts’ perception of ECB policy such that their estimated coefficient
is now closer to the ECB’s coefficient α. Since the financial market crisis, the experts’
inflation parameter has continued to decrease significantly. This finding implies that in
this period the experts seemed to see less need for the ECB to fight inflation given the
severe economic environment. Whereas (α¯−α) measures the accuracy of the financial
analysts’ expectations regarding the ”true” value α, σα measures their disagreement.
Table 2 shows that disagreement with respect to the inflation parameter is relatively
moderate and hardly changes during the entire sample period. In particular, the
experts’ disagreement over the ECB’s reaction to inflation does not become stronger
during the financial crisis.
With respect to output growth, the estimated parameters of the financial market
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experts are negatively signed until July 2007 and positively signed since August 2007
(see Table 2). The latter finding suggests that financial analysts expected the ECB to
be more supportive of output growth. Indeed, the ECB decreased interest rates from
4% in August 2007 to 1.5% in March 2009. The ECB motivated monetary policy
easing primarily with declining inflationary risks. Table 3 shows that the experts’
assessment of the weight of output growth deviated significantly from the central
bank’s weight in all subperiods. The strongest misperception regarding the ECB’s
reaction to output growth appears during the period of the financial crisis. Until
July 2007, disagreement about the output parameter (σβ) was similar in size to the
dispersion parameter for inflation, but it has increased considerably since the financial
crisis, suggesting a stronger disagreement over the ECB’s reaction to output.
The mean squared error (MSE) in the third panel of Table 2 represents a summary
impreciseness measure for the experts’ misperception of the ECB’s interest rate policy.
For example, MSEα = (α¯ − α)2 + σ2α accounts in each subperiod for the deviation
of the experts’ average inflation parameter α¯ from the central bank parameter α and
the dispersion σα. Table 2 shows that for inflation, this measure decreases over time,
whereas for the output parameter, the mean squared error is highest since the outbreak
of the financial crisis.
6 Conclusions
There is a growing consensus among economists and central bankers that expectations
management by the central bank is crucial to effective monetary policy. Because
households and firms are forward looking, central banks affect the economy as much
through their influence on expectations as through any direct effect of their policy
instruments. Therefore, central banks are increasingly interested in how markets
form expectations about future interest rate decisions. If market participants are
confused about the goals and rules of monetary policy, analyzing expectations data
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should reveal that individual forecasters systematically misunderstand future interest
rate decisions.
This paper investigated why financial market experts misperceive the interest rate
policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). Assuming a Taylor–rule–type reaction
function of the ECB, we employed qualitative survey data on expectations about the
future interest rate, inflation, and output to discover the sources of forecast error. To
that end, we decomposed the individual interest rate forecast errors of financial experts
into two components. The first part of the error occurs because forecasters are wrong
about future inflation and output, even if they correctly assess the monetary policy
strategy. The second part of the error, however, occurs because markets are confused
about monetary policy, i.e., there is a lack of understanding as to how the central
bank sets interest rates in response to inflation and output. In the case of this second
type of error, communication ought to be improved because markets will misperceive
future monetary policy decisions even under perfect information about the economic
outlook. We estimated the empirical relevance of both components for interest rate
forecast errors using a panel random coefficient model in order to explicitly account
for the heterogeneity and disagreement of forecasters.
Our empirical results reveal that financial experts have systematically misunderstood
the ECB’s interest rate rule. However, although experts tend to overestimate the
impact of inflation on future interest rates, their perceptions of monetary policy have
been far more accurate since the ECB clarified its monetary policy strategy in May
2003. Due to this improved communication, we find that there has been less disagree-
ment over the ECB’s response to inflation during the financial crisis.
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A Appendix
A.1 More Details about the Data
Table 4: Survey expectations of inflation and output: Descriptive statistics
Jan 00 - Oct 03 Nov 03 - Jul 07 Aug 07 - Mar 09
Expected 6–month change in inflation
µ(piejt) -0.12 0.21 -0.08
σ(piejt) 0.74 0.65 0.83
Expected 6–month change in output
µ(yejt) 0.40 0.34 -0.39
σ(yejt) 0.65 0.61 0.63
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics of the individual survey
expectations with respect to output and inflation. The data are quali-
tative with possible discrete values {-1,0,1}.
Figure 1: Euro zone time series data
−
10
−
5
0
5
pe
rce
nt
2000m1 2002m1 2004m1 2006m1 2008m1 2010m1
date
Notes: 3-month Euribor (black line), HICP inflation (dashed line) and six month growth rate of
industrial production (grey line) in the euro zone.
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Table 5: Description of Variables
Variable Definition
∆6it Change in 3–month Euribor from t− 6 to t
∆6pit Change in annual HICP inflation from t− 6 to t, SA
∆6yt Growth of industrial production from t− 6 to t, SA
Survey expectations Survey question
∆6iejt ”In the medium–term (6 months) the short–term
interest rates (3–month–Interbank rate) will
... increase / no change / decrease”
∆6piejt ”In the medium–term (6 months) the macroeconomic annual
inflation rate will ... increase / no change / decrease”
∆6yejt ”In the medium–term (6 months) the overall macroeconomic
situation will ... improve / no change / worsen”
Definition of subperiods
DI January 2000 to October 2003
DII November 2003 to July 2007
DIII August 2007 to March 2009
Notes: All data refer to the euro zone. Data sources: ECB, Thomson Financial Datastream,
ZEW.
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